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THE FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS IN HERDER'S THOUGHT. II

HERDER'S CRITICISM OF THE PRINCIPLE OF "IMITATION OF NATURE"

Under the rule of the imagination, which through the influence of the naturalistic philosophy had displaced the absolute reason of classicism, or rather pseudo-classicism, as the aesthetic faculty, Lessing concluded that modern art was no longer limited to the beauty of Greek art (wrongly regarded by him as absolute), but had gained for its range all "visible," i.e., concrete nature, of which beauty, in Boileau's sense, is only a small part. In selecting its objects of imitation from concrete nature, art must, however, use discretion. It must give preference to those objects and to those moments in the continuous sequence of events, which permit the most play to the imagination. It must choose the "pregnant" moment. Now, of all the possible moments, that of the culmination of an event is the least fitted to stimulate imagination. For whatever can be conceived as happening beyond that point must be inferior in intensity and interest.

Further, in art, a formal permanence is given to a passing moment. But no extreme stage can be regarded as enduring. De Lamettrie, who had himself portrayed as Democritus, the laughing philosopher, 289]

would on repeated view become more and more offensive. His laugh would gradually appear as a hideous grin. Similarly, an open-mouthed Laocoon would become disgusting; so would a raging Ajax and a Medea depicted in the act of murdering her children. The poet, on the other hand, whose means or "signs" of expression are not simultaneous as those of the artist, but successive, is not bound to one moment. He can proceed successively and cumulatively.

Herder points out the confusion involved in Lessing's demand for the choice of a moment which is not transitory. The only part of nature which is not transitory is dead nature. The life, the soul, of any object is manifest in its transitoriness. In limiting art to the intransitory parts of bodies we take from it *ihren besten Ausdruck*. "Whatever living (*seelenvollen*) expression," he argues, "we may imagine in any body, is always transitory. The more the body reveals a human passion, the more it represents a variable condition of human nature." He continues to prove that Lessing's "pregnant" moment is no more enduring than his climactic moment.

As well as I can say to a laughing Mettrie, on seeing him the third and fourth time and finding him still laughing: "Thou art a coxcomb," I can say to Myron's cow (a picture praised by Lessing): "Why doest thou keep on standing; why doest thou not go away?" For the same reason that I find a roaring Laocoon finally intolerable, I should also ultimately, if somewhat later, grow weary of a sighing Laocoon because he never stops sighing. Similarly, I should become bored with a standing Laocoon because he keeps on standing instead of sitting down; and also of a rose by Huisum (a noted painter of roses), because it keeps on blooming instead of withering.

In nature everything is transitory, passion of the soul and sensation of the body, activity of the soul and motion of the body: every state of finite and variable nature.

Thus every imitation of nature must as such be unnatural and irritating because it unnaturally prolongs a transitory moment.

From this Herder concludes that the true purpose of art cannot be objective at all but must be subjective. He rejects thereby the entire theory of imitation, which is fundamentally objective.

He now proceeds to apply this new principle to poetry and art by combining with it the Aristotelean distinction between "work"

and "energy."¹ A "work" embodies a complete idea in a definitive form. In the measure in which art succeeds in being such a "work," it is enduring, *ewig*. This use of the word *ewig* in the meaning of formal perfection is common to the great German writers of the last generation of the eighteenth century.² It is the transcendentalistic, subjective conception of eternity. The artist is to portray not a moment in actual nature, for if literally permanent such a moment would be lifeless, but *den langen, seligen Ausdruck*, the *ewige Moment*, i.e., not an imitation of actuality but a synthesis which through its perfection prevents repeated observation from becoming tiresome and so has an abstract subjective element of permanence. The reason why the extreme moment in any action is not fitted for art is not that it is any more transitory than any other but that on repeated view it becomes empty and tiresome.

Poetry, on the other hand, and all the arts which produce their effects through the passing of moments in time, are forms of "energy" in the Aristotelean sense. These arts³ must not, like pictorial art, aim at one complete and supreme moment which would absorb all our attention, but at an unbroken chain of actions of which each moment would be only one link and not a detached climax.

He then defines the "beautiful," which is the subject of pictorial art, as the quality which, by setting all its parts in a simultaneous harmony, makes the whole a fit object for the *ewige Anblick*.

But even this static beauty of pictorial art is, according to Herder, not an objective form as it is to Lessing, but a symbolic or characteristic expression of the nature of the human soul. It also is secondary to personality.

Physical beauty is not sufficient. For through our eyes there peers a soul, and therefore a soul must peer through the physical beauty portrayed

¹ This distinction between "work" and "energy" had been used before Herder by the English writer Harris.

² Cf. Goethe's

"Er kann dem Augenblick
Dauer verleihen,"

in "Das Göttliche"; also "Dauer im Wechsel." See Introduction to my edition of *Goethe's Poems*, pp. iv f.

³ "Müssen keinen Augenblick ein Höchstes liefern, wie auch unsre Seele in dies augenblickliche Höchste verschlingen wollen, denn sonst wird eben die Annehmlichkeit gestört, die in der Folge, in der Verbindung und Abwechslung dieser Augenblicke und Handlungen beruht, und jeden Augenblick nur als ein Glied der Kette, nicht weiter, nutzt. Wird einer dieser Augenblicke, Zustände und Handlungen, eine Insel, ein abgetrenntes Höchstes, so geht das Wesen der energischen Kunst verloren."

for us. And in which state should this soul shine forth? Without doubt, in that which can sustain my view longest. And which is that? No state of idle calm which suggests nothing to me; none expressing itself in exaggerations, which would clip the wings of my imagination; but rather the motion which is, as it were, about to declare itself, the dawn of action which offers a view in both directions and thus presents in the inexhaustible wealth of its outlook, what may be called the "eternal view."¹

PERSONALITY AT REST AND IN ACTION

The crisis of the conflict has now been reached in Herder's criticism of Lessing's application of the sensualistic theories to the techniques of poetry and art. Since, argues Lessing, the eye takes in objects simultaneously grouped in space, the "signs" of visual expression, which are the natural means of pictorial expression, as lines and colors (and values, of which Lessing and his literary contemporaries knew naught) are fit to "imitate" or represent objects only in the simultaneous spatial order. The "signs" of poetry, i.e., articulate sound, being successive,² can "imitate" objects only in the order of time.

Lessing illustrates these conclusions with some passages from the *Iliad* and the classical Greek tragedies, and with further conclusions drawn from the Laocoon group.

In his principal thesis Lessing states the fundamental difference between the two arts in question thus, that pictorial art "imitates" or represents one simultaneous static relation of objects in space, whereas poetry "imitates" successive objects occurring in time. The latter he calls actions. He finds this distinction borne out by two scenes in the *Iliad*, namely, the making of the bow of Pandarus and the council of the gods. He defines the former as a progressive visible action, the different parts of which occur consecutively in time; the latter as a static visible action, the different parts of which develop simultaneously (*nebeneinander*) in space. He proceeds to define "bodies" as "objects which or the parts of which coexist

¹ ". . . Sondern die sich gleichsam ankündigende Bewegung, die uns zu beiden Seiten hinschauen lässt und also einzig und allein ewigen Ausblick gewährt." Herder has a strong, poetical predilection for the moment of dawn, in its literal as well as metaphorical sense. Dawn is the mirror of youth to his ardent, ever-young spirit.

² And "arbitrary," i.e., symbolic in regard to their meaning. The distinction of "natural" and "arbitrary" "signs" played a considerable part in the aesthetic theories of Dubos and Harris and others. See p. 72, footnote.

simultaneously in space"; and "actions" as "objects which or whose parts occur successively in time." This limitation of poetry to "actions" is the result of the successive nature of its signs of expression. For in order to produce the illusion, the poet must adapt his imitation of objects to the successive order of expression imposed by the nature of his medium. Lessing applies this theory to an analysis of the Homeric description of the shield of Achilles, pointing out that the classical poet cast this description in the form of an account of the making of the shield. If, he concludes from that, a poet wishes to describe, he must follow the example of Homer and turn the static object in space, of which he wishes to produce a picture in the mind of his audience, into a succession of objects in time. He severely criticizes his contemporaries, especially Haller, for having written descriptive poetry.

This distinction between the two arts is crucial, and Herder's criticism of its various elements strikes at the foundations not only of Lessing's theories but of the entire complex tradition on which they rest, and at the same time lays down the foundations of his own theories. Herder corrects Lessing's definition of action by pointing out that "the idea of succession is only a part of the idea of action. Only succession produced by a spontaneous force (*Successives durch Kraft*)¹ is action." Succession is a pure abstraction, whereas action is a concrete embodiment of a living force.²

Lessing, by pushing his sensualistic theories too far, confounds the sequence of verbal sounds with the associations of images and ideas, which are the true objects of poetic discourse. These ideas, while perceived by means of a succession of sounds, yet follow a principle of association independent of those sounds. This principle must be embodied in the spontaneous forces which turn succession into action. Herder calls the associative bond "coherence of imaginative ideas (*zusammenhängende Bildergriffe*).

It is therefore wrong to limit poetry to succession in time. For, though uttered in succession, it yet belongs also to space because

¹ *Kraft* to Herder meant a spontaneous principle, as will be shown later.

² "Ich denke nur ein in der Zeitfolge wirkendes Wesen, ich denke nur Veränderungen, die durch die Kraft einer Substanz [the Leibnitzian monad!] aufeinanderfolgen: so wird Handlung. Und sind Handlungen der Gegenstand der Dichtkunst, so wette ich, wird dieser Gegenstand nie aus dem trocknen Begriffe der Succession bestimmt werden können."

it is concrete action. Poetry thus being at home both in the spheres of time and space is the "discourse of perfect sensibility" (*sinnlich vollkommene Rede*).

Herder adds that Lessing's argument fails also because it proves too much. For if the succession of the sounds of speech determined the sequence of ideas, then prose and every form of scientific discourse would also have to forego description—which is absurd.

Herder now develops his own theory in an analysis of the Homeric accounts of the assembling of Juno's chariot by Hebe, of the making of the bow of Pandarus, and of the fashioning of the shield of Achilles by Vulcan.

The "action" of Hebe's putting together the chariot of Juno (*Iliad* E 722–31) is so detailed and gradual that by the time the last part is added the hearer has forgotten the first. If the poet had aimed at giving a picture of the chariot as a whole, i.e., if his action had served the purpose of description or imitation of an object, his method would have been unsuccessful.

Next, as to the bow of Pandarus, he says:

If Homer, in order to depict the bow of Pandarus, has first to make us follow the hunt of the ibex from whose horns the bow is to be made; has to show us the rock where Pandarus kills his game, and how he measures the length of the horns; then takes us to the craftsman and makes us witness every detail of the manufacture of the bow—how can anyone conclude from this that Homer had intended to have the succession of the events of his narrative, as it were, coincide with the conditions of coexistence in space, by making the description of the different parts of the bow keep pace with the progress of his discourse? It is impossible to assume that Homer, unless one regards him as a bungler, intended a description of the bow.

Herder's interpretation of the story is the following: Homer is not concerned with the description of the bow as such. He tells progressive actions because he has to keep pace with the general progress of his main action. He only acquaints us with the bow of Pandarus so far as the associations awakened by the bow are essential to the progress of his story. We learn the story of the bow not to be interested in its details as such, but to gain a conception, the most vivid, concrete, forceful conception possible, of the prowess of Pandarus, the might of his arm, the strength of the bow, and the terrible possibilities of his use of it. "When Pandarus now takes the bow,

draws the string, places the arrow, releases the string—woe to Menelaus struck by an arrow from such a bow! We know!"

Homer does not intend to give a picture of a "work" but an account of an "energy"; he is not concerned with the bow as an independent object, but chiefly as an appropriate dramatic symbol of an action involving its owner and its victim.

Similarly, the putting together of the chariot of Juno by Hebe does not serve the purpose of description. Hebe, a goddess, is not put to the pains of a minutely detailed task, in order that we may have a complete, simultaneous visual picture of a lifeless object, but in order that we gain a vivid impression of the excellence, the perfection of the parts, the value, the importance symbolized by the exquisite care bestowed by Hebe, a goddess, on the conveyance worthy of the queen of the Olympians. Homer did not aim at description of an object, but at an account of a characteristic and interesting action involving beautiful and momentous personalities.

The true poetic purpose of the story of the shield of Achilles is similar. The greatest hero of the Trojan War is in need of a shield; Thetis, his mother, a goddess, begs one of Vulcan, another god. He promises, rises, goes to work. "The whole scene is part of the action of the poem, of the progress of the epic," and is in no way an instance of a manner peculiar to Homer.

In the making, in the growth, of the shield, there lies all the power of the "energy," the continuous process determined by a living force, which is the poet's aim. In every figure which Vulcan engraves upon the shield, I admire the creative god, in every indication of the proportions and the surface I recognize the mighty shield which is to serve Achilles, and for which the reader, absorbed in the action, longs as eagerly as Thetis.

Herder continues,

In short, I know no successions in Homer, which had to serve as artifices, as makeshifts, in the place of descriptions or static pictures. These successions are the essence of his poem, they are the body of epic action. . . . If Homer requires a physical picture he describes it, even if it is a Thersites; he wots not of artifices, of poetic tricks or hazards; progress is the soul of his epic.

Herder's method of attack is that of individualizing essential features, which Lessing had failed to analyze. He overcomes

Lessing by proof of overgeneralization. He shows that in the discussion of the Greek idea of beauty, in the definition of the synthetic moment, which is the proper subject of pictorial art, in the definition of action as identical with succession, in the identification of the successive nature of the sounds of speech with the order of association of ideas, Lessing failed to take into account the one essential factor common to all these matters, namely, individual personality. He concludes that personality must be the essential principle of poetry and art.

He did not at this time see the full theoretic significance of his idea, which required some ten years to reach maturity. At the time of our *Wäldchen* he was still strongly under the influence of Leibnitz. In his endeavor to give his conclusion theoretic unity and the proper philosophical form of generalization, he borrowed from Leibnitz the term "force" (*Kraft*), which expresses the active element of the monad, Leibnitz' embodiment of the primary, absolute, unchangeable, and irreplaceable principle of spontaneous individuality. The fundamental importance of this conception lies in the fact that in Leibnitz' philosophy for the first time in modern thought the principle of personality is opposed to the objective absolute reason of French rationalism and the objective—and equally absolute!—nature of the British realism of Bacon and Locke as the primary fact of reality.

This principle appears in the more concrete form of *Naturwüchsigkeit* (native spontaneity), as the central idea in the thought of Bodmer and Breitinger.

This idea, far deeper and broader than the more limited conception of Rousseau, which involves rather the more primary impulses and emotions together with personifications of the inanimate forces of nature, than the complete human personality, is the particular philosophical contribution of the German mind to the thought of the eighteenth century. This is the fundamental motive in Herder's entire work. It is the more unfortunate that German systematic philosophy was for generations diverted from its most characteristic heritage by the masterfully keen, but narrow, dry, and too featureless genius of Kant, who turned the vigorous fresh current into the formalism of Cartesian rationalism, methodologically qualified by

psychological infusion drawn from Berkeley and Hume. Abandoned by Kant, this immensely fruitful idea was left to the violent and immature conceit of the Storm and Stress movement which caricatured it, and to the morbid egoism of the Romantic movement which perverted it. Even in the classical decade beginning in 1790, the rationalistic influence, as will be shown in a later chapter, frustrated many of its vital impulses.

This idea persists throughout Herder's life, forming the fundamental motive of all his important theories: That the world of all reality, as well as that of art and poetry, consists primarily of individuals, not one of which is like any other, and each of which is necessary to the whole and must preserve its essential character. This is the essence of Herder's humanism.

To return to the specific question, individual personality is the primary fact of aesthetic reality. The aim of all the arts is "truth and expressiveness" (*Wahrheit und Ausdruck*) of personality. All other facts, external objects, abstract ideas as well as the forms and techniques, are conditioned by this. "Imitation" thus loses significance as a principle and becomes a secondary form of expression. Poetry is at liberty to use either description or succession to suit its main purpose. Not description as such is wrong, but description in the wrong place and manner.¹

Under the theory of personality there can be no absolute, universal, necessary beauty, but only relative appropriateness as an expression of a specific form of personality. Art and poetry are not interested in the representation of objects except inasmuch as they serve to characterize individuality.

This is not merely a correction and qualification of details of Lessing's doctrine, but an original and fundamentally new orientation in reality.

The chief difficulties inherent in Herder's view will be discussed in a later chapter.

It is no longer necessary henceforth to discuss Lessing's theories in detail. Herder's criticism has taken away their foundations. We shall limit ourselves to a brief summary of the remaining main

¹ See also chapter xviii of the *Wäldchen*, which contains Herder's summary of his conclusions regarding "energy" in poetry.

theses of Herder's essay, which easily reveal their significance, because they are simple applications of his fundamental idea of personality.

"GODS AND MENTAL BEINGS, PERSONIFIED ABSTRACTIONS"

Lessing, following the rationalistic logic, had assumed that the gods represented in pictorial art are personified abstractions. To the painter, "Venus is nothing except love." Poetry, on the other hand, treats gods like beings in action (*handelnde Wesen*).

Herder, in chapter xi, puts this subject also on the proper ground. The poets, he says, were the makers of mythology. Homer's gods are "heavenly individuals," which have added to them certain typical characters. They are "not," as Lessing asserts, "merely beings in action, which, in addition to their general characters, have other traits and emotions, which may according to circumstance, predominate over the former"; but "their true nature consists in those other traits and emotions, whereas their general character is only a later generalization of those individual traits. This generalization is incomplete and subordinate and is often not taken into consideration by the poets," who are interested in individuals. "If pictorial art has to give its gods typical rather than individual characters, it does not manifest thereby its essence but its mechanical limitations." Venus, for instance, is not limited to "typical" actions. She may rave and rage; she is still no abstraction of love but the goddess of love, the mother of Cupid, the woman in love, in concrete reality."

The actions of the gods as well as of human individuals reveal their characters. Therefore pictorial poetry, illustrated by Horace, is weak.¹ Poetry has more direct symbols of action than art.

In judging of the size and the appearance of gods in Homer we must consider first not general ideas but their individual characters. *Charakter ist hier über Gottheit*; i.e., individuality is here above type.

There follow in chapter xv in a discussion of translations from Homer very interesting stylistic remarks, the main significance of which from our point of view is the principle of individuality applied

¹ The chief advocate of pictorial poetry in the eighteenth century was Daniel Webb, whereas the French writer Caylus advised the artists to "imitate" passages from the classical poets.

to style. One of the most characteristic elements of Homer's style he finds in "a certain manner of repeating some principal feature that had appeared before and now serves as a means for continuing the picture and binding into unity different sections which otherwise would fall apart."¹

Lessing overgeneralized not only in dealing with the relations between art and poetry, but even in his analysis of poetry as such. On the premise that Homer depicts progressive actions, Lessing concludes that poetry as such is limited to actions. Herder applies his method of individuation to this subject also. Part of the passage is so characteristic that it invites literal transcription: "Homer creates in narration: 'it occurred! it came into being!' Everything with him can therefore be action and must hasten on to action. That is the aim of the energy of his Muse. Marvelous, pathetic events are his world. His word of creation says: 'It came into being.'" But "Anacreon hovers between song and narrative. His story becomes a song; his little song an epic of the god of love. He can choose this turn: 'it was,' or 'I will,' or 'thou shalt'—enough if his *melos* resounds with joy and pleasure; a lofty emotion is the energy of each one of his songs." Pindar, the odic singer, has still another purpose: "A poetic picture, in which is visible everywhere, not the work of art as such but the artist: 'Behold me, singing!'"

He sums up:

Where can there be a comparison? The total production of Homer, Anacreon, Pindar, how different! How unlike the achievement they intend! The one narrates; the whole of the event is his aim; he is the poet of the past. The other one does not intend to speak; joy itself sings through him; the complete expression of a delightful sensation is his purpose. The third speaks that we hear him; the whole of his ode is very skilful and symmetrical structure.

It is therefore wrong to regard as Lessing does the work of one poet, no matter how great, as embodying the rules of all poetry. Each type of poetry, each individual poet must be judged on the basis of particular character, gifts, and purposes.

The last part of the *Wäldchen*, beginning with chapter xxi, is devoted to the discussion of the ugly and the disgusting. The

¹ " . . . ein gewisses Wiederkommen auf einen Hauptzug, der schon da war und jetzt das Band sein soll, um das Bild weiter zu führen und die auseinander fallenden Züge zu einem Ganzen zu verknüpfen."

details do not concern us here. But the ground on which his conclusions rest is important. It is another logical application of his principle of personality. Lessing followed the rationalistic theory in regarding ugliness as an absolute formal principle expressing the negation of the classical idea of the beautiful. He analyzed the term no more than he did that of the beautiful. Herder, having subordinated formal absolute beauty to personality, proceeded likewise with that of the ugly. Ugly is that which embodies an ugly personality. Lessing, bound by the rationalistic theory that the Greeks did not portray ugliness, had been hard put to it in accounting for Thersites in the *Iliad*. His final solution, which was an evasion (but an evasion forced upon the whole pseudo-classicism, which he followed), is that ugliness might serve the purposes of humor. "Homer made Thersites ugly in order to make him ridiculous." Herder, on the other hand, proves that Homer was very much in earnest in creating Thersites. Thersites "is not a ridiculous but a malicious, snarling rascal; he has the blackest soul of all the men before Troy." He is made more contemptible by having to suffer a trouncing at the hands of Ulysses. That by taking himself seriously he now and then makes himself ridiculous is true; but this ludicrousness is only a secondary quality in him.

Lessing, as pseudo-classicists generally, was forced by his absolute formalism to derive the conception of the terrible as well as the ridiculous from the ugly. Herder calls attention to the beauty of certain forms of homeliness based on character. He also shows that the ridiculous need not be ugly. Nor is the "terrible," which Lessing defined as the "dangerously ugly," dependent on ugliness. The Homeric gods are terrible, but certainly not ugly.

The expression of specific personalities, either in a static simultaneous form in space or in a continuous progressive action in time, is the subject of all art and poetry; that is the thesis of Herder's first *Wäldchen*.

The immediate questions arising from Herder's main conclusion are whether and in what respects personality is the measure, not only of the works created by art and poetry, but also of the poet and artist, and of the public which is both audience and creative environment

of the author and his works. As to the *significance of the thing created*, Herder is most explicit. The subject of art is an individual personality. The objects and events are not primarily introduced as parts of objective reality, but as subordinate manifestations of personality. They are part of the machinery of characterization and not imitations of objects of nature. They are, as Herder saw clearly and showed in his analysis of the Homeric stories of the bow of Pandarus, the chariot of Juno, and the shield of Achilles, not primary, but symbolic in their significance.

Herder's sound sense of reality kept him from pressing the symbolic function of objective reality too far. It was left to the Romantic movement to develop this symbolic part of objectivity into a subjective monism, in order to remove all obstacles from a vision of a universal absolute force of personality, and so, by ignoring the objective relations of personality, to destroy that also.

Herder, however, was somewhat lacking in the formal sense, both in composition and in style, and his ear was not sensitive to the finest music and cadences of diction. Though in this respect far in advance of his contemporaries among the aesthetical critics and of most of the poets as well, it becomes now and then obvious that he does not make a clear distinction between the natural truth of characters portrayed and the artistic truth which produces focus in a work of art. His conception of the "energy" as a continuous expression of individualities leads him to neglect the requirements of constructive unity.

There is one aspect of this question of which Herder was at this time apparently unconscious, namely, the part of personality in a work of art treating of inanimate nature, i.e., of landscape art. Herder, at the time of the first *Wäldchen* knew nothing of landscape painting, and never had much opportunity and inclination to study it. Even the poetical aspects of external nature had not, at this time, revealed themselves to him to any significant extent. His nature-sense did not awaken until a few years later during the solitude and homesickness of his Bückeburg days. But after that time, he gave his conception of personality a remarkable extension by including in it a symbolic interpretation of nature, which in beauty,

magnificence, and penetration has not been surpassed in critical literature. This will appear in the discussion of his *Geist der Ebräischen Poesie*.

Herder has indicated his conclusions regarding *the relativity of the significance of works of art and poetry with regard to the personalities of their creators*, in his rejection of Lessing's attempt to make Homer the standard of all poetry, and in his differentiation of Homer, Anacreon, and Pindar. Individualization of each creative genius in each particular work is his critical aim. It also is his particular gift, in which he surpassed all the men of his era. Unequaled in sympathetic discernment, the rarest gift of the creative critic, Herder became the greatest and most fruitful interpreter of poetry and of the humanistic movements of history, in which a fine and profound sense of the creative personality is the chief requirement. This gift of individualization will be discussed in detail in connection with his works on folk poetry, on the forces determining the subjects and character of poetry, on translations, on genius and related subjects, and on the *Ideen* and the *Humanitätsbriefe*.

The *relations of the public to the works of art and poetry* can be discussed to better advantage in a later chapter, in which Herder's views on the influence of environment on personality are interpreted.

Another important question is that of the specific formal elements pertaining to his conception of beauty as conditioned by personality. Herder was occupied with it at the time of our *Wäldchen*, and reached interesting and important conclusions. These will be presented in a later chapter devoted to Herder's theories regarding the forces which determine personality and so control its valuation.

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NOTE

We regret that irregularity in the mail service and editorial oversight occasioned in the June instalment of this article the following typographical errors: p. 1, l. 16, *read the for an before* absolute; p. 2, l. 19, supply comma after *Ideen*; p. 4, l. 22, *omit the after of and read* achievement *for* achievements; p. 4, l. 29, *read is for in before* his; p. 8, footnote, *read Stein for* Hein *and insert "op. cit." after* Howard; p. 9, l. 1, *read dangers for* angers; p. 9, l. 10, *read Holbach for* Holboch; p. 9, l. 30, supply commas *after but and were, and read* by the processes of *for in* accordance with; p. 10, l. 8, *read Mars for* "Mars"; pp. 10 ff., *read Laocoon for* Laokoon except in title of Lessing's work; p. 10, footnote, *read Batteux for* Batteaux.